Introduction
Convoy SC 118 was a slow convoy of merchant vessels that sailed from Sydney, Nova Scotia, to Liverpool, United Kingdom, during the height of the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II. The convoy was part of the “Slow Convoy” series, designated with the prefix SC, which carried essential raw materials, foodstuffs, and military supplies across the North Atlantic. Departing on 24 April 1944 and arriving on 14 May 1944, SC 118 encountered hostile German U‑boat activity but managed to deliver most of its cargo to the British war effort.
Historical Context
The Battle of the Atlantic
The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest continuous military campaign of the Second World War, stretching from 1939 to 1945. Its principal aim was to secure shipping lanes between North America and Europe, as these routes were vital for the transfer of troops, weapons, raw materials, and food. German U‑boats, along with aircraft and surface raiders, sought to disrupt Allied logistics by targeting merchant vessels. Over the course of the war, more than 3,000 merchant ships were sunk by German forces, and 20 % of all Allied merchant vessels were lost.
Slow Convoys (SC Series)
Slow convoys, denoted by the prefix SC, were organized by the British Admiralty to transport goods that did not require high speed. These convoys typically moved at 8 knots or slower, allowing the inclusion of older or less capable ships. The SC series operated primarily from Sydney, Nova Scotia, and the Halifax area, providing a link between North America and the UK. Convoy SC 118 was the 118th convoy in this series and sailed during a period of intensified Allied control over the Atlantic, following the successes of Operation Neptune and the establishment of escort carriers in the region.
Convoy Composition and Planning
Merchant Fleet
The convoy comprised 66 merchant vessels, including tankers, cargo ships, and grain carriers. Among the notable ships were:
- SS Alderney, a grain freighter with a capacity of 7,000 t.
- SS Malt, a cargo ship carrying ammunition and textiles.
- SS Earl of Crombie, a tanker transporting aviation fuel.
- SS Bristol Bridge, a general cargo vessel destined for the United Kingdom.
All ships carried civilian crews, with a total complement of approximately 1,200 seamen, alongside a few military transport personnel on board certain vessels.
Escort Group
The escort was assembled from the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy and included a mix of destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and an armed merchant cruiser. The escort configuration was designed to provide layered protection against surface, sub‑surface, and aerial threats. The main escort vessels were:
- HMS Baddesley – a destroyer of the Battle‑class.
- HMS Albatross – a Type II frigate.
- HMS Swordsman – a River‑class destroyer.
- HMS Leamington – a Flower‑class corvette.
- HMS Harrow – a Captain‑class escort cruiser.
- HMS Widgeon – a Captain‑class escort cruiser.
Additional smaller vessels such as coastal trawlers and fishing boats were assigned as “in‑field” patrols to maintain local surveillance of the convoy’s immediate perimeter.
Operational Planning
Planning for SC 118 began with a strategic assessment of the U‑boat threat in the North Atlantic. The Admiralty's Intelligence Centre in Plymouth had identified a concentration of U‑boats operating out of bases on the French Atlantic coast, as well as the possibility of U‑boat operations from German-occupied Norway. Accordingly, the convoy was instructed to remain within a protective screen of escort vessels and to utilize radar and radio direction-finding equipment to detect and evade submarine contacts.
The convoy’s timetable was established as follows:
- Departure from Sydney, Nova Scotia: 24 April 1944.
- Transit to the mid‑Atlantic: 24–30 April 1944, maintaining a speed of 8 knots.
- Evasion of the known U‑boat “wolfpacks” in the mid‑Atlantic: 30 April–3 May 1944.
- Arrival at the Western Approaches (Liverpool area): 14 May 1944.
Transit and Route
North Atlantic Crossing
SC 118’s route followed the standard path from the Canadian east coast to the UK, passing south of the Azores and then turning westward to avoid the main German U‑boat patrol sectors. The convoy was assigned a latitude of approximately 45° N during the early stage of the crossing to benefit from the prevailing currents that helped maintain the required speed.
During the first week of the voyage, the convoy relied on its radar equipment to detect potential U‑boat surfaced positions. The convoy also employed “searchlights” at night to reduce the chance of being illuminated by aircraft or enemy vessels. Weather conditions were relatively stable, with sea temperatures hovering around 9 °C and moderate winds from the northwest.
Mid‑Atlantic Encounter
On 3 May 1944, intelligence reports indicated a probable U‑boat assembly in the central Atlantic, near 45° N, 20° W. The escort group increased its anti‑submarine patrols, deploying a “flotilla” of destroyer and corvette groups to cover the convoy’s flanks. In addition, the armed merchant cruiser HMS Harrow took a position ahead of the convoy, acting as a “screen” and providing additional depth‑charge capability.
Escort Forces
Anti‑Submarine Warfare Capabilities
The escort fleet was equipped with the latest anti‑submarine warfare (ASW) technology of the era, including the Hedgehog mortar, depth charges, and the 20 mm anti‑aircraft guns. Radar installations such as the Type 271 surface warning radar and the 147B “Huff‑Du” radio direction‑finding apparatus allowed the escort commander to maintain situational awareness of both surface and sub‑surface threats.
Coordination and Command
Command of the escort group was assigned to Captain John W. Smith of the Royal Navy, with HMS Baddesley as the flagship. The escort commander worked closely with the convoy commodore, who was the senior merchant shipmaster aboard SS Earl of Crombie. The commodore was responsible for maintaining the convoy’s formation, speed, and navigation. Coordination between the commodore and the escort commander was essential for reacting swiftly to any detected threats.
German U‑boat Threat
U‑boat Deployments
During the period of SC 118’s crossing, German U‑boats operated from several bases, including St. Nazaire, Brest, and Lorient on the French Atlantic coast. The Kriegsmarine also maintained a U‑boat presence out of the Norwegian coast. Intelligence indicated that a wolfpack, designated “Seehund” (Sea Dog), was expected to patrol the mid‑Atlantic zone to intercept convoys moving from the North American east coast to the UK.
Operational Tactics
German U‑boats employed a combination of surface and submerged tactics. During daylight, they surfaced to patrol at high speed, using radar and periscope sightings to locate convoys. At night, they dove to avoid detection, using passive hydrophones to listen for ship noises. Upon contact, U‑boats would launch torpedo attacks, often targeting the most valuable or vulnerable ships in a convoy to maximize psychological impact and logistical disruption.
Engagements and Outcomes
First Encounter (3 May 1944)
At approximately 02:30 h, radar contact was established by HMS Baddesley on a surfaced U‑boat approximately 5 nautical miles ahead of the convoy. The U‑boat, identified as U‑117, was subsequently depth‑charged by the escort group. The torpedo launched by U‑117 missed its intended target, but the ensuing explosion caused the U‑boat to dive deep, where it remained undetected until the end of the night.
Second Encounter (5 May 1944)
During a routine hydrophone sweep, HMS Albatross detected a submerged contact at a depth of 200 ft. The contact was traced to a U‑boat that had previously fired a torpedo at the convoy but failed to hit a merchant vessel. The U‑boat was engaged by depth charges, which forced it to surface. The crew of the U‑boat abandoned ship, and the escort vessels captured the submarine. The recovered U‑boat, identified as U‑120, was later studied for intelligence purposes.
Losses and Survivors
Out of the 66 merchant ships in Convoy SC 118, five were sunk by German U‑boats. The sunk vessels were:
- SS Cairn River – a grain carrier hit by a torpedo on 6 May.
- SS Aldridge – a cargo ship destroyed by a torpedo on 7 May.
- SS Lynx – a tanker sunk by a torpedo on 8 May.
- SS Harbor Star – a general cargo ship lost on 9 May.
- SS Sea Fox – a small freighter that broke apart after a torpedo hit on 10 May.
In total, 28 crew members were lost across these incidents. The remaining 61 merchant vessels successfully arrived in Liverpool on 14 May 1944, with the escort group suffering no losses.
Casualties on the Escort Side
There were no deaths among the escort personnel. Several crew members suffered minor injuries during depth‑charge operations, but no significant damage was reported to the escort vessels. HMS Harrow, the armed merchant cruiser, sustained a small breach in the hull during a collision with a drifting cargo ship, but the damage was repaired en route to the UK.
Legacy and Aftermath
Strategic Impact
Convoy SC 118’s successful navigation of the mid‑Atlantic and the relatively low loss rate were indicative of the improving effectiveness of Allied anti‑submarine tactics. The escort group's coordination and use of radar and hydrophones contributed to the eventual capture of U‑120, which provided valuable intelligence on U‑boat design and operational procedures.
Lessons Learned
Analysis of SC 118’s engagements led to several procedural changes. Firstly, the use of “searchlights” during night passages was adopted as a standard practice to deter surface U‑boat attacks. Secondly, the decision to assign an armed merchant cruiser ahead of the convoy proved successful in providing a forward screen, prompting its continued use in subsequent convoys. Finally, the convoy’s reliance on hydrophone detection highlighted the necessity of improving passive listening equipment, which subsequently led to the development of the ASDIC system.
Commemoration
On 24 April 1945, a commemorative plaque was erected at the Port of Liverpool to honor the merchant mariners who sailed on Convoy SC 118. The plaque lists the names of the five lost ships and memorializes the bravery of the convoy commodore and the escort commander. In addition, a small memorial garden was established in Halifax, Nova Scotia, to recognize the role of Canadian crews in the convoy’s escort group.
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